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1. Introduction 
 
Metaphor and irony are figurative meanings by which we say one thing 
and mean another. Although typically we use them independently, say, to 
make the hearer perceive some similarity in the case of metaphor, or to point 
out some discrepancy between the situation put forward and what we really 
think about it in the case of irony, the two purposes are not exclusive. We 
may yet be both metaphorical and ironical by using a metaphorical 
utterance with an ironic intent.  
For example, while each of the following sentences may be used 
metaphorically 
 
(1) You are the cream in my coffee. (Grice 1989) 
(2) Mary is the Taj Mahal. (Bezuidenhout 2001) 
(3) Shamir is a towering figure. (Stern 2000) 
(4) What delicate lacework! (Stern 2000) 
 
– respectively, to convey that the hearer is the most precious thing in the 
speaker’s life, that Mary is very attractive, that Shamir is a respectable man, and 
to commend someone’s calligraphy – they may also be used ironically without 
loss of these metaphorical meanings: so used, (1) conveys that the hearer has 
fallen short of the speaker’s affection; (2) that Mary is far from being attractive; 
(3) that Shamir is not taken seriously or respected among his peers; and (4) that 
someone’s handwriting is awful.  
In these latter cases, how should we describe the utterance? Is it an ironic 
metaphor, or a metaphorical irony? This question concerns the logical order 
of interpretation as well as the temporal order in the actual psychologically 
processing. Do we first interpret the utterance metaphorically and only then 
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determine its ironic interpretation? Or do we first determine the ironic 
interpretation and then interpret it metaphorically?  
The central aim of this paper, which is pursued in the first part, is to 
answer these questions. We argue that both logically and psychologically, 
metaphor is prior to irony: both in terms of rational reconstruction, and in 
terms of psychological processing, the phenomenon is one of ironic 
metaphor, i.e. in that a metaphorical meaning is put to ironic 
conversational use, rather than an irony used metaphorically. In the second 
part, we use this result to argue for the claim that in metaphor, it is 
metaphorical, not literal, meaning that determines truth-conditions.  
 
 
2. Ironic metaphor interpretation 
 
2.1 Metaphor’s priority over irony 
 
Let us call the logical (respectively, psychological) thesis that in ironic 
metaphor, the metaphor is prior to the irony the logical (respectively, 
psychological) ‘metaphor’s priority thesis’ (henceforth MPT). Grice 
(1989, 34) is the first to advocate logical MPT, when he claims that in (1) 
the hearer has to reach first the metaphor ‘You are my pride and joy’ and 
then calculate an ironic interpretation ‘You are my bane’ on the basis of it. 
Unfortunately, however, he does not give an argument for this claim, nor 
how the passage from metaphorical to ironical meaning is negotiated. We 
aim to remedy this omission. 
Our strategy involves distinguishing weak from strong versions of both 
logical and psychological MPT: 
 
Weak MPT:  in some cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is/has to 
be computed first.  
Strong MPT:  in all cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is/has to be 
computed first. 
 
So we are left with four versions of MPT. In order of increasing strength 
they are: weak psychological MPT, weak logical MPT, strong 
psychological MPT, and strong logical MPT. We argue for each in turn. 
Our argument for weak psychological MPT is as follows. It is widely 
agreed that irony operates globally on propositional contents to determine 
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new contents.1 But at least sometimes, metaphor operates locally on 
expressions (before the whole utterance is computed).2 Since local 
operations work prior to global operations, this seems to support 
psychological MPT in those cases in which the metaphoric interpretation 
is local. While this consideration supports the weak version of 
psychological MPT, it does not support the strong version, however. For 
irony is not always computed globally. For example, when we hear “The 
fountain of youth is getting her pension,” said looking at and referring to 
an old woman, the ironical meaning is grasped as soon as we realize the 
contrast between the noun phrase and the salient situation.3 However, 
without access to the salient context, hearers would have to compute the 
whole utterance anyway, and factor in the internal contradiction between 
(the literal meaning of) the definite description used to refer to the woman 
talked about and the property attributed to her, that of being of an 
advanced age.4  
This localized metaphor argument tells us that in some cases of ironic 
metaphor the metaphor is computed first. Is there any evidence for weak 
logical MPT’s stronger claim that in some cases of ironic metaphor, the 
metaphor has to be computed first? We propose to tackle this issue by 
reasoning ad absurdum and looking at the difficulties for an irony-first 
approach. Consider the case in which sentence (4) above is used 
concerning a doctor’s indecipherable scrawl. Suppose the hearer first 
retrieves the irony, what would that be? What is the contrary to lacework?5 
It seems impossible to pin down an appropriate contrary to the literal term 
that might then be interpreted metaphorically so as reconstruct the 
intended interpretation. At least in some cases, there is a conceptual 
                                                 
1 This corresponds to a Gricean account of irony in terms of conversational 
implicature that is derived on the basis of what is said plus contextual information. 
2 This speaks against a Gricean analysis of metaphor in terms of conversational 
implicature, depending on the computation of the literal meaning of the whole 
utterance. For various arguments for a local analysis of metaphor see Récanati 
1995; Stern 2000; Bezuidenhout 2001; Wilson and Carston 2007. Such a view will 
be spelled out in section 2, where we discuss four arguments for a contextualist 
approach of metaphor as part of what is said.  
3 A local analysis of irony would justify a semantic account of sarcasm in terms of 
SARC operator at the logical form, whose function is to invert the truth-
conditional content of a word’s literal semantic content; for a rejection of it see 
Camp (forthcoming). 
4 Perhaps direct reference theorists would still be able to defend a local analysis 
insofar as they take the old woman herself to be a constituent of the proposition 
expressed. 
5 For simplicity, we consider the traditional view of irony as contrary of saying. 
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difficulty underlying the irony-first approach: there is no rational route to 
the opposite of the literal term, without prior retrieving the metaphor, as 
Stern (2000, 236) argues: 
 
The element of the context that is most relevant to determine the 
appropriate contrary [of the literal term] at this first stage is information 
related to the feature in terms of which the expression will then be 
interpreted metaphorically at the second stage. So, to select an ironic 
contrary, it is necessary to have some knowledge already of the 
metaphorical interpretation of the expression. 
 
He further explains that finding the relevant ironic contrary independent of 
the metaphorical meaning seems difficult because it is not always easy to 
find “a literal (ironic) contrary of the original expression, which, under its 
subsequent metaphoric interpretation, will express a feature contrary to the 
feature metaphorically expressed by the original expression” (2000, 236). 
Translating this for a case like (4), we would have an irony first, of the 
simplified form ‘That’s not lacework’ (where ‘lacework’ keeps its literal 
meaning), and then a metaphor ‘That’s not beautiful, crafted handwriting.’ If 
Stern’s worry is that the literal ironic contrary interpreted metaphorically in 
a second stage is not the same as the metaphorical contrary of lacework, say 
not beautiful, crafted handwriting, at prima facie this does not seem 
justified: both seem to have the same import. Even though Stern does not 
give a knockdown argument for the logical impossibility of an irony-first 
approach, he puts us on the right track.  
To see how we can make this more precise, there are a few things 
about the context that needs to be put in place. The topic of conversation 
guides the hearer’s interpretation: he knows that the speaker in (4) is 
referring to a scrawl, which is for anybody just awful, and thus has to 
make sense of the speaker’s inappropriate utterance. According to the 
rational reconstruction strategy, irony could come first, even though in an 
unqualified or inappropriate form – the literal ironic contrary does not 
refer to the handwriting but to a real lacework, and be completed 
metaphorically in a second stage. We claim that this is wrong. One reason 
is that to get the right contrast required by the intended irony, this has to 
relate to the handwriting the speaker is talking about. Furthermore, to 
understand the irony used in relation to the handwriting presupposes in a 
certain sense that the metaphor has already been computed so as to 
establish the intended referent. Since referents have to be established 
before what is said is obtained, and since irony as conversational 
implicature builds on what is said, the necessity of metaphor’s priority 
seems to follow. Another reason against the irony-first strategy is that the 
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irony computed in a first stage as a negation of the literal term of lacework 
might be wrongly understood as referring to another (salient) situation, say 
to comment on some expensive curtains that the cat just ripped to shreds, 
and would not require a further metaphorical reinterpretation, while in 
effect the right result for an ironic metaphor should be a negation of the 
metaphorical meaning. Finally, if we consider the possibility that irony is 
local, say for instance that the word delicate is used ironically, it seems 
that, on the irony-first approach, the irony ‘That lacework is not delicate’, 
interpreted then metaphorically does not give the intended reading. These 
reasons speak, we think, for the necessity of retrieving the metaphor first. 
What about (3) – does the hearer have to compute the metaphor before 
the irony? Stern (2000) argues that either order of interpretation may do, and 
explains the unfixed order in (3) by the metaphor’s high degree of 
conventionalisation. Since the metaphorical meaning ‘of exceptional 
importance/influence’ is a lexicalized meaning of towering figure, and thus 
can be selected from its potential meanings (like in sense disambiguation) 
without retrieving the literal interpretation, we can see why an irony-first 
order is possible: the metaphoric interpretation being short-circuited, it does 
not make much difference whether it is computed before or after the irony, 
because it can be easily retrievable in either position. Were we to defend this 
view, we conjecture that, from a psychological viewpoint, once the irony 
‘diminutive figure’ is computed, the metaphor ‘unimportant person’ would 
be computed almost simultaneously in a context where we discuss Shamir’s 
career, not his height.  
If this is a somewhat trite metaphor, let’s take a conversation about the 
economic situation where a financial reporter says It’s a sunny day today, 
isn’t it?, pointing out that the stock market has just gone down drastically.6 
He is both ironical and metaphorical. If we were to understand the irony first 
– ‘The weather is terrible today’ – and then interpret it metaphorically to 
mean ‘The economic news is bad today,’ that would be possible, because the 
irony is very conventional, and it may be aided by a sarcastic tone. 
However, there is a much stronger reason to believe that the metaphor-first 
alternative is more plausible. Again, the topic of conversation seems to 
guide the interpretation: given the metaphorically salient context about the 
economic turmoil, rather than the horrible atmospheric conditions (it may 
happen that the participants are not even aware of the weather, as they are 
waiting for the latest news from Wall Street), the metaphoric interpretation 
                                                 
6 Thanks to Kendall Walton for the example. 
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‘The economic news is good’ is primed first, for then to be interpreted 
ironically due to the contrast with the salient situation in the stock market.7 
The difficulty of an irony-first order of interpretation is even more 
patent in (1)-(2), since the irony necessarily builds on the metaphor: one 
could hardly avoid a metaphoric interpretation because what is said 
involves a category mistake (the hearer cannot be an inanimate object in 
(1); Mary cannot literally have the property of being a building in (2)), and 
thus cannot have a plausible literal interpretation. If we go with irony first, 
what we get is some unqualified irony yielding a banal literal truth: ‘You 
are NOT the cream in my coffee’ in (1) and ‘Mary is NOT the Taj Mahal’ 
in (2). Clearly, they do not make much sense, and have in effect no 
ironical flavour, unless they are priorly metaphorically interpreted 
(moreover, if we were to phrase the irony as Grice does ‘You are my 
bane’, how are we supposed to reinterpret this metaphorically?). 
Discussing an example like (2), Bezuidenhout (2001, 163) argues that the 
right order of interpretation cannot be irony-first; the reason is that cases 
of once-removed metaphors (i.e. metaphors launched from irony or 
indirection) are difficult, if not impossible. For example, it seems 
impossible to utter It’s cold in here intending it to be taken ironically – 
‘It’s warm in our vicinity’ – which in turn is intended metaphorically – 
‘Our emotional climate is friendly’. On this basis, she concludes that when 
other interpretations are present, the metaphoric one must precede them. 
Thus, for (2) to be successfully interpreted – the man implicates he would 
not be willing to go out with Marry described ironically as Taj Mahal – a 
specific order of interpretation is required:  
 
- a metaphoric interpretation P is first generated from the particular 
expressions employed in a sentence S;  
- P is then interpreted ironically, producing interpretation Q;  
- Q can in turn generate a further implicature R. 
 
To buttress the argument against the irony-first order of interpretation, we 
may think of an analogous argument to ironic metaphor, that of idioms 
used ironically. Thus, a quasi-metaphorical idiom don’t give up the ship 
used to communicate that one should persevere in the face of adversity, 
when it is used in the context of someone giving up, it functions ironically, 
but only if it is first understood as metaphor for perseverance. Similarly, 
                                                 
7 A different explanation for the metaphor’s priority may be given in terms of 
conceptual metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980): the metaphor A SUNNY DAY 
IS SUCCESS when used ironically conveys an opposite conceptual metaphor A 
CLOUDY/STORMY DAY IS CRISIS/ANXIETY. 
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burying the hatchet as referring to declaring an end to hostilities, or peace, 
when used in the context of someone NOT making peace, it will function 
ironically. Other examples of this sort are locking the barn door after the 
cows have fled, striking gold, it’s a gold mine, etc.8 
Given the difficulties discussed above for an irony-first approach, this 
supports weak logical MPT, i.e. that in some cases of ironic metaphor, the 
metaphor has to be computed first.9 Now, is there an argument for strong 
logical MPT, i.e. that in all cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor has to 
be computed first? The first claim would be to say that the correct standard 
interpretation of an ironic metaphor, such as He is a towering figure, is 
closer to that of 
 
(a) the associated simple irony 
Utterance:   He is important 
Ironical meaning:  He is not important 
 
than it is to that of 
 
(b) the associated simple metaphor 
Utterance:   He is not a towering figure 
Metaphorical meaning: He is not important 
 
The second claim would be to say that this fact is correctly predicted by 
strong logical MPT, on which the order of interpretation is 
 
Metaphor-first proposal 
Utterance:   He is a towering figure 
Metaphor:   He is important 
Irony:   He is not important 
 
but is not correctly predicted by, the irony-first proposal, on which the 
order of interpretation is 
 
                                                 
8 Thanks to Sam Glucksberg for the suggestion and examples. 
9 Another reason for the metaphor-first approach is that irony and metaphor seem 
to require different mechanisms of interpretation; if they were similar in nature, we 
would expect more freedom, or inversion, in the order of interpretation. Relevance 
theorists argue that metaphors are used descriptively to represent a possible or 
actual state of affairs, while ironies as used interpretively to (meta)represent 
another representation (a possible/actual utterance/thought) that it resembles in 
content; see Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson 2006. 
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Irony-first proposal 
Utterance:   He is a towering figure 
Irony:   He is not a towering figure 
Metaphor:   He is not important 
 
Now we reach a difficult point (insofar as there are practically no 
experiments on comprehension of ironic metaphors) of assessing whether 
there is evidence for strong psychological MPT, i.e. that in all cases of 
ironic metaphor, the metaphor is computed before irony. The only 
psycholinguistic hypotheses are proposed by Colston and Gibbs (2002), 
who found that processing ironic metaphors (e.g. He’s really sharp!) takes 
more time/effort than simple ironies (e.g. He’s really smart!).10 One may 
make sense of this in terms of increased inferential steps necessary for 
computing two figurative meanings rather than one. Colston and Gibbs 
explain this difficulty, however, in terms of a certain ambiguity as to what 
exactly an ironical metaphorical speaker really means, insofar as the 
metaphorical meaning somewhat competes with the ironic one (for the 
interpretation of sharp). Thus, the hearer has to engage in a complex 
inference to resolve the ambiguity and recognize that both metaphorical 
and ironical meanings are intended. Another explanation, from a 
relevance-theoretic perspective, would be to say that, since metaphor is 
understood descriptively and irony interpretively, we can expect that 
combining different processing modes, as is needed in ironic metaphors, 
increases the effort needed to understand what speakers mean more than in 
understanding simple ironies where one processing mode is required. 
Although Colston and Gibbs’ experiments focus primarily on the 
metarepresentational inferences underlying irony processing, making 
descriptive claims about the inferences involved in ironic metaphor, they 
claim that the metarepresentational inferences in ironic metaphor are 
reduced as compared with understanding simple ironies. They relate this 
result to metaphor’s capacity for muting the ironical meaning, whereas 
enhancing metaphoric effects. However, one may consider two other 
hypotheses about the amount of metarepresentational inferences involved 
in ironic metaphor, as compared to simple ironies.11  
First, understanding ironic metaphor may enhance the degree of 
metarepresentational inferences as compared to processing irony alone. The 
                                                 
10 Giora (2003) also found that salient (familiar) metaphors take longer to understand 
when they are uttered in ironical contexts rather than in metaphorical ones. 
11 We claim that the ironical meaning in ironic metaphor is determined by the same 
mechanism as the one that operates in standard non-metaphorical ironies: tacit 
echoic use combined with elements of pretence (Popa forthcoming). 
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metaphorical formulation of someone else’s thought, or the metaphorical 
thought which the speaker is echoing in ironic metaphor {The speaker believes 
that [X believes that (X believes that ((P))]} is expected to increase the 
inferential steps. Note that this possibility would be in tension with the claim 
that metaphor is processed directly (i.e. as part of what is said), since the 
utterance should be first interpreted literally, then metaphorically, and then 
ironically. However, this possibility is dismissed given the low ratings for the 
inferences required for understanding metaphors.  
Secondly, understanding ironic metaphor may require the same 
amount of metarepresentational inferences as processing simple ironies. 
Adding a metaphor to a speaker’s ironic utterance should not complicate 
the metarepresentations the hearer has to infer. There should be no 
consequential difference in terms of metarepresentations between echoing 
a metaphorical thought or formulating metaphorically another’s thought in 
the case of ironic metaphor, and echoing a literal thought in the case of 
simple irony, since both thoughts are expressed directly. The fact that the 
hearer has to think about the speaker’s thoughts to understand irony 
(requiring thus second-order mindreading abilities12), or about her thoughts 
about another’s thoughts to understand ironic metaphor shouldn’t increase the 
range of second-order inferences. This shows, we think, that the metaphorical 
formulation of another’s thought or someone else’s metaphorical thought that 
the speaker is echoing in ironic metaphor has the same contribution as any 
other representation of an actual/potential state of affairs; both kinds of 
                                                 
12 Testing the difference in metaphor and irony comprehension in autistic patients, 
Happé (1993) found an asymmetry in their processing: metaphor is interpreted via 
first-order mind-reading abilities [The speaker believes that (P)], while irony requires 
second-order mind-reading abilities {The speaker believes that [someone else believes 
that (P)]}. Whatever the reality about metaphor is, there is overwhelming evidence 
that for understanding irony subjects need to think about the thoughts the speaker 
is thinking of. Winner (1988) makes this point clear by comparing the tasks 
subjects have to undertake so as not to confuse irony with simple mistakes or 
deception. As Wilson (talk given at the Interpreting for Relevance conference, 
Kazimierz Dolny 2008) suggests, a distinction is needed between (a) ‘spontaneous 
mindreading’ abilities involved in ordinary understanding in the sense that for the 
hearer to understand an utterance he needs to attribute to the speaker 
beliefs/intentions, and (b) ‘epistemic abilities’ required to pass the false-belief test, 
which are more related to the evaluation of the output of the pragmatic 
interpretation in order to judge whether it is true or not, and decide if to believe it 
or not. If the former are underpinning understanding of speaker’s meaning, the 
latter require a critical attitude: the hearer has to think about the truth of 
propositions and assess the reliability of the speaker, forming the basis of what 
Sperber et al. (forthcoming) call ‘epistemic vigilance’.  
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thoughts contribute to what is said by the utterance. This correlates with the 
suspicion that perhaps metaphor comprehension does not require first-
order mindreading abilities, suggesting that it should be processed easier 
and earlier than the irony. Furthermore, the fact that metaphor is part of 
the metarepresentation the hearer needs to construct to understand the 
irony seems to suggest the necessity of metaphor’s priority, thus 
confirming strong psychological MPT.  
Until we have more decisive evidence about the difficulties in 
processing ironic metaphors, let us end this section with two conjectures 
about such a possible cause. First, if metaphor were direct (i.e. 
contributing to what is said), and as irony is indirect, then in combining 
together they somehow interfere one with another, which is what happens 
in ironic metaphors and what explains, we surmise, the difficulty we have 
in understanding them.13 Secondly, the fact that metaphoric interpretation 
is often so rich, such that it is sometimes associated with an open-endness 
or indeterminacy as to what exactly the thought the speaker wishes to 
convey is, we can see why combining with an irony the indeterminacy of 
metaphor is transmitted to the ironic metaphor, creating thus a 
combinatorically loaded task for the hearer in choosing and testing which 
of the possible metaphorical meanings is intended to be interpreted 
ironically. It is thus important to distinguish between what is called the 
‘pregnancy’ of metaphor responsible for its richness and open-endness – if 
a metaphor is good, then the more one thinks about it, the more one seems 
to discover in it, so that one can never be sure that one has exhausted its 
content, which is typical of poetic metaphors, and the efficacy in asserting 
a specific proposition, which is typical of conversational metaphors. The 
latter kind may be used to make different assertions, making thus true or 
false statements.14 Be that as it may, we established so far that MPT is 
correct, i.e. in all cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is/has to be 
computed first, and so then it can serve as input for the ironic 
interpretation. But how is irony computed? 
 
 
                                                 
13 Gibbs (1986) found that sarcastic indirect requests, e.g. Why don’t you take your 
time to wash the dishes? are processed faster than a direct request Hurry up and wash 
the dishes or the literal counterpart Please wash the dishes. He argues that the reason 
for this easiness might be that both sarcasm and indirect requests convey meanings 
communicated indirectly, and thus do not interfere one with another. 
14 Bergmann (1982, 238) develops an interesting account of assertive uses of 
metaphor, in which she argues that what distinguishes metaphorical assertions 
from literal ones is not the content of what is said, but the manner of saying it. 
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2.2 Irony takes metaphorical meaning as echo 
 
Although metaphor and irony are both specifically intended in ironic 
metaphors, the ironical meaning seems to bear the speaker’s main point, 
whilst the metaphor is merely a springboard to communicate an ironical 
attitude. We rely here on an account of irony as a hybrid of pretence and 
echoic elements that we defend elsewhere (Popa forthcoming) so in 
speaking ironically a speaker tacitly echoes a thought similar in content with 
her utterance or the proposition expressed by it, or pretends to assent to a 
perspective put forward by her utterance.15 We do not see any problem 
arguing that, given MPT, an ironical metaphorical speaker echoes a 
metaphorical meaning/thought/utterance that somebody might have put 
forward, or metaphorically formulates someone else’s thought to which she 
wants to express a disapproving attitude. On the pretence track, she merely 
displays a metaphorical claim pretending to assent to it, with the aim of 
drawing the hearer’s attention to the contrast it creates in an ironical context. 
Again, this seems to suggest that the metaphor should have been already 
computed for it to be put to a conversational ironic use.  
In terms of intentions, it is important to understand why an ironical 
metaphorical speaker uses a metaphor, if her intention is primarily 
ironical. We think that even though ironic metaphors seem to achieve the 
same goal as simple ironies, in using a metaphor (usually positive ones) 
with an ironic intent, speakers make the contrast between the positive 
referent and the negative situation become less vivid, thereby attenuating 
the threatening attitude that ironies usually convey. The metaphor seems to 
ensure a buffer zone for the ironical contrast to be diffused, creating a 
space where metaphoric effects can resonate, and behind which the 
speaker may easily retract if a sensitive hearer argues with or questions her 
ironical claim, arguing that she merely meant to be metaphorical. The 
general effect might be one of teasing, or humorous, as the speaker takes 
distance, via irony, from the metaphorical evaluation she only puts 
forward under a pretence mode, and laughs at such a ridiculous claim or 
whoever believes it. 
As we take the Gricean account of irony as conversational implicature to 
be correct, irrespective of the echoic or pretence theoretical flavour, we 
assume that the ironical meaning arises as an implicature grounded in what is 
said. Now, since in cases of ironic metaphor the ironic interpretation is 
conditioned upon the metaphorical one (as the relevant echo that needs to be 
                                                 
15 For selective references on echoic and pretence accounts of irony, see Clark and 
Gerrig 1984; Currie 2006; Wilson 2006. 
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recognized), it follows that the ironic metaphorical meaning is an implicature 
grounded in the metaphorical meaning, developing in a different direction 
though. This is crucial insofar as it is indicative of the metaphor’s contribution 
to either ‘what is said’ by the utterance or to what is implicated by it. In the 
next section, we consider the consequences of the ironic metaphor account on 
the metaphor’s relationship with what is said and truth-conditions. 
 
 
3. Metaphor, what is said, and truth-conditions 
 
On Gricean accounts, metaphor is an indirect expression by which 
speakers intentionally say one thing in order to communicate something 
different. Metaphorical meaning arises from a blatant violation of the first 
maxim of Quality (“Do not say what you believe to be false”); it is arrived 
at by first calculating the proposition literally expressed, which then, given 
its conversational inappropriateness, leads the hearer to implicatures. 
Against this view, there are four standard arguments to the conclusion that 
metaphorical meaning contributes to what is said.16 Our account of ironic 
metaphor offers a fifth. Having argued that in ironic metaphor, the 
metaphor is processed first, we must now ask: In such cases, is the 
metaphor processed directly (i.e. as part of what is said), or indirectly (i.e. 
as implicature)? We argue that it is processed directly. 
 
 
                                                 
16 We understand ‘what is said’ not in the Gricean sense as closely related to the 
meanings of words, their order, and their syntactic character, but in a contextualist 
sense, which captures our intuitions about what has been said in various contexts. 
Thus, context-specific information and expectations interact with conventional 
linguistic meanings intruding into semantics to determine what a speaker says on a 
certain occasion. Under this view, what is said is defined in terms of what speakers 
do in uttering their words, because saying involves the direct expression of the 
speaker’s intended meaning. Different notions cover the idea of an enriched what 
is said (e.g. relevance theorists’ explicature, Bach’s impliciture, Récanati’s primary 
meaning), which incorporates various pragmatic processes so as to determine a 
truth-valuable proposition. On the contextualist view, what is said in the sense of 
what is asserted consists of the semantic content of the utterance, plus enrichment, 
loose talk, metaphor, etc. which are taken to intrude into the utterance’s truth-
conditional content. 
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3.1 Four contextualist arguments for metaphor’s directness 
 
(i) Psycholinguistic evidence  
 
Two kinds of empirical study, one regarding the neural processes involved 
in metaphor interpretation, the other regarding comprehension times, 
suggest that metaphor comprehension is direct. First, Coulson and van 
Petten (2002) question a sharp distinction between literal and metaphoric 
interpretation on the grounds that both sorts of interpretation engage 
similar brain processes. Secondly, Gibbs (1994), Gibbs and Tendahl 
(2006), Glucksberg (2001) found no difference in the times taken to 
interpret literal and comparable metaphorical utterances, thereby 
disproving two consequences of the Gricean account: that metaphor 
comprehension takes no longer than literal interpretation, and is not 
optional, occurring only when the latter is anomalous.  
The claim is that contextual processes penetrate the lexical ones early 
on, fine-tuning appropriate contextual meanings, so that the interpretation 
is effortless and seamless, involving no incompatible interpretive stage. 
The metaphorical meaning is accessed straight away without activating a 
literal interpretation and then rejecting it. Glucksberg (2001) argues that 
metaphor comprehension is both mandatory and automatic in the same 
way literal language is, suggesting that the literal meaning is actively 
inhibited in favour of the more appropriate metaphorical one. These 
findings are compatible with Récanati’s (2004) account and that of 
relevance theorists, who argue that metaphor interpretation is a sub-
personal process, operating at the level of constituent and without 
requiring that the sentence’s meaning be computed prior to the metaphoric 
interpretation. In standard conversational metaphors, speakers express 
directly their metaphorical thoughts, and hearers are not aware of the 
distinction between literal and metaphorical meanings, even though the 
latter is, technically, grounded in the former one.  
 
(ii) Embedded metaphors  
 
Metaphors’ embeddability within the scope of logical and propositional 
attitude operators poses a problem for the Gricean view that metaphorical 
content is conversationally implicated, since conversational implicatures 
should not be embedded within the scope of logical and other operators. 
The problem is as follows: metaphorical implicatures appear to be 
triggered by sub-parts of certain complex sentences, as with the metaphor 
‘the sun’ embedded in Mercutio’s report of Romeo’s utterance in (5):  
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(5) Romeo believes that Juliet is the sun. 
 
Mercutio is not attributing to Romeo the belief that Juliet is the real sun 
(the literal meaning), but rather a belief provided by the metaphorical 
content that Juliet is beautiful, nurturing, worthy of worship, etc. As 
Wearing (2006: 313) argues, this couldn’t be accounted for by Gricean 
theories, because the metaphor as conversational implicature is the product 
of a conflict between what is said and the conversational maxims, whilst in 
(5) the embedded metaphor is implicated by something that is not said. 
The sub-parts of the complex sentences in embedding cases do not 
constitute what is said by those utterances, and so cannot be the source of 
conversational implicatures.  
 
(iii) Reports of and responses to metaphorical utterances  
 
Speakers/hearers have intuitions about the metaphoric interpretation as 
part of what is intuitively said. This is reflected by the speakers’ reports of 
the metaphorically expressed contents (to which they commit themselves), 
and by the hearers’ responses (agreement or denial) to metaphorical 
utterances by echoing the speaker’s metaphorical content. Hearers respond 
to metaphorical content as if it is what is said, rather than as something 
implicated, otherwise such responses would be infelicitous (Hills 1997, 
Wearing 2006). To illustrate, here is a dialogue adapted from 
Bezuidenhout (2001): 
 
(6) A: Bill’s a bulldozer. 
B: That’s true. We want someone who’ll stand up to the 
administration and get things for our department. 
C: I disagree that he’s a bulldozer; that exterior hides someone 
who’s basically insecure. But, either way, Bill wouldn’t make 
a good chair. 
 
It appears clear that what B and C are agreeing and disagreeing, 
respectively, is with the metaphorical content of A’s utterance. 
Bezuidenhout (2001: 157) argues that A says, with an assertoric force, that 
Bill is a bulldozer (meaning, roughly, a tough guy capable of getting over 
difficult obstacles), and that B and C are either agreeing or disagreeing 
with what A says. The idea is, as Bergmann (1982), Stern (2000) have  
already emphasized, that metaphorical utterances express (truth-valuable) 
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propositions, and thus can be used to make assertions.17 That the 
metaphorical content is part of what the speaker says/asserts, or has an 
import to the truth-conditional content of the utterance, is clear from B’s 
reply That’s true (‘that Bill is a tough guy and will get things done’), while 
C could reply That’s not true (‘that Bill is a tough guy, so he couldn’t 
make a good chair’).18 Even though C is picking upon a more physical 
property of the metaphorical meaning of bulldozer (say, the appearance of 
a big, unbeatable guy), the intended psychological property is indeed 
available to him for explicit response. If the metaphorical content ‘tough 
guy’ were an implicature (i.e. a proposition that is implicated by the saying 
of something else), such responses as Yes, he is or No, he’s not would be 
infelicitous. As Wearing (2006, 312) points out “one can’t agree that Mr. 
X has no philosophical talent by saying ‘Yes, that’s right,’” in response to 
Grice’s example of the letter of recommendation formulated as “Mr. X is 
always punctual and has nice handwriting.” So, it seems that we do 
respond to the metaphorical content as if it is what is said, i.e. what the 
speaker expresses directly, rather than something she implicates. What is 
more is that, not only does A commit herself to the metaphorical content 
as part of what she says/asserts, but by lodging a new metaphorical 
meaning in the words uttered, she creates the conditions for that meaning 
to be inherited by any later use of those same words in that same context 
responding to her initial claim.  
 
(iv) Availability Criterion 
 
Récanati (2004) posits the Availability Criterion (i.e. for any given 
utterance, we have conscious access to what is said and its implicature(s), 
and to the inferential process that mediates them) in order to distinguish 
primary processes (corresponding to what is said) and secondary processes 
(corresponding to implicatures). While secondary processes like 
conversational implicatures, indirect speech acts are available – hearers 
are aware of both that the speaker has said that p and implicated that q, and 
that there is an inferential link between them – this is not the case for 
                                                 
17 Obviously, metaphorical utterances can be used to make other sorts of speech 
acts, like questions, requests, etc. 
18 We should bear in mind that the notion of saying we refer to here is a stronger 
notion involving speaker commitment (i.e. ‘asserting’, committing oneself to its 
truth), as opposed to a weaker one as merely ‘expressing’ a proposition, without 
any commitment to its truth. Bach (2001) characterizes the former as an 
illocutionary act of ‘stating/asserting’ (i.e. doing something by saying it), and the 
latter as a locutionary act, independent of speakers’ communicative intention. 
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primary processes, say like conversational metaphors (e.g. The ATM 
swallowed my credit card). Récanati claims that the interpretation of such 
conversational metaphors goes smoothly and directly, without retrieving 
and then rejecting the utterance’s literal meaning; upon encountering the 
word swallow the hearer modulates its extension (via a process of 
broadening) so as to apply to ATM and cards. While clearly in this case 
we are not aware of the inferential relation between the literal meaning of 
the utterance and its intended metaphorical meaning (as we simply do not 
compute the former), Récanati admits that there are cases of more creative, 
extensive metaphors (e.g. The ATM swallowed my credit card, chewed for 
a while and then spat it out), in which speakers/hearers are aware of some 
discrepancy between the literal and metaphorical meanings (what he calls 
‘internal duality’), but this is at the level of the primary meaning. 
However, this should not be taken as supporting a traditional Gricean view 
of metaphor as conversational implicature, because, as Récanati argues, 
we are aware of this discrepancy inasmuch as we aware of the output of 
the primary interpretation corresponding to what is said; we are neither 
aware of the sub-personal machinery, nor of the inferential link between 
the literal and metaphorical meanings, as would be the case with 
conversational implicatures. 
 
 
3.2 The argument from ironic metaphor: Metaphor as a vehicle 
for implicatures 
 
So far, we argued that in cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is 
computed before the irony, and we discussed evidence for the claim that 
metaphor is processed directly as part of what is said. Even so, a Gricean 
might still want to challenge the four contextualist arguments above (see 
Camp 2006) and defend a view of metaphor as conversational implicature. 
What resources do we have to prove that metaphor as implicature is 
wrong? Bezuidenhout (2001, 163) already advanced an argument to the 
effect that in the present cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphoric 
interpretation must be launched from the utterance itself and not from a 
pragmatic interpretation that is indirectly arrived at (e.g. irony, indirect 
request, or any other implicature); indeed, we saw that such cases are 
precluded by MPT. So it seems fair to say that once the metaphor is 
directly processed, it then serves as a springboard to launch further 
implicatures, thereby communicating further meanings, including the 
ironical one, not the other way around, that is, the irony launching the 
metaphor. It has been argued that the possibility of a non-literal 
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interpretation of an utterance launching an implicature may be used as a 
criterion to distinguish what is said from what is merely implicated.  
Camp (2006, 291) objects that the property of launching further 
implicatures is singular to metaphors, since sarcasm and implicature can 
both launch further implicatures. For example, when Bill asks Alice whom 
they should invite for dinner, she responds sarcastically Well, Jane is 
always so utterly charming, implicating that under no condition should 
Jane be invited. Addressing the question when an indirect interpretation 
can set up a further implicature, Camp argues that “in order for an 
implicature Q to be launched from an interpretation P of an utterance U, 
the speaker’s intention for U to be interpreted as P has to be open and 
obvious, and not merely insinuated.”19 She then argues that metaphor and 
sarcasm meet this requirement, as they are “well-established routes for 
communicating something by an utterance other than its conventional 
meaning.” We agree with this, with the specification however that the 
speaker’s intention for an utterance to be interpreted ironically is merely 
insinuated, even though in many cases there is a certain transparency or 
overtness that we wish to be interpreted so. Nonetheless, we agree less 
with Camp’s claim that “an implicature can be launched from P whenever 
the speaker’s intention for U to be interpreted as P is sufficiently obvious, 
even though P is itself an implicature.” The problem, as we see it, is two-
fold. First, if P were an implicature, the speaker’s intention for U to be 
interpreted as P is not, and can’t be, that obvious and open as Camp would 
want to (in Grice’s letter of recommendation example the professor is 
merely insinuating that the student is not a good philosopher by saying 
that he’s punctual and has a nice handwriting). The reason why we 
                                                 
19 By this formulation, the example of sarcasm launching a further implicature that 
Camp discusses seems defeated, since the speaker’s intention for U to be 
interpreted as P (here sarcasm), although open and obvious in the sense that Alice 
wishes to be understood as sarcastic, is pace Camp merely insinuated (Alice 
doesn’t want to commit herself to the sarcastic claim she merely suggested, and at 
any moment she can retract behind a literal claim denying that she meant that Jane 
is not charming). Moreover, there seems to be a certain misuse of ‘implicature;’ 
while sarcasm is definitely an implicature, the further implicature that Camp 
claims to be launched by the sarcasm seems to be rather an ‘implication’ (i.e. a 
proposition that is likely to be true or to follow if the proposition expressed is true 
and other information from the background is known to be true, e.g. that Bill and 
Alice don’t like to invite around people full of themselves, like Jane) than an 
implicature. An implicature is a proposition implicated by the saying of something 
else, but we wouldn’t want to say that here the proposition ‘Jane shouldn’t be 
invited to dinner’ is implicated by the ‘saying’ of a sarcasm – sarcasm is not part of 
what the speaker says; it is what she implicates. 
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communicate information indirectly is not to commit ourselves to the 
claim we merely suggest, and if we are challenged we can easily retract 
behind the literal meaning. While this is typical of irony, it is not so of 
metaphor.20 Secondly, if we bite the bullet and accept that metaphor is an 
implicature, then by Camp’s argument, given that it can launch further 
implicatures (say, an irony), the interpretation of ironic metaphor would 
involve a case of nested implicatures.21 
Coming back to our positive proposal that metaphor not only comes 
first in the order of interpretation, but is processed directly as part of what 
the speaker says/asserts, then by factoring in that metaphor is a vehicle for 
launching the irony the following argument seems to emerge: 
 
(a) If a non-literal interpretation launches an implicature, it belongs  
to what is said rather than to what is implicated. 
(b) In ironic metaphor, the metaphor launches an ironic interpretation  
(which is an implicature grounded in metaphor). 
Then  
(*)  The metaphor is computed as part of what is said.  
Since 
(c)  What is said gives the truth condition of an utterance. 
It follows from (*) that 
                                                 
20 We agree with Camp’s (2006, 291) point that for poetic, allusive metaphors, such 
condition of obviousness fails, because it’s difficult to determine the precise content 
communicated by a poet. We give serious thought to the claim that poetic metaphors 
are perhaps derived as implicatures, but somehow the argument that we can’t 
paraphrase the exact content the poet wishes to convey exhaustively and in all its 
nuances, or that this is open-ended, does not seem correct either. This does not make 
it an implicature; a poet may want to convey that content directly as a disjunction of 
propositions, leaving to readers the freedom to choose the propositions that are more 
salient and make more sense to them in the context, and given their own background. 
Again, the indeterminacy of novel metaphors does not imply their being conveyed 
indirectly, like with Grice’s famous letter of recommendation. However, if people 
like Camp are right, then we would need an explanation for the separate treatment of 
conversational metaphors as contributing to what is said, and creative metaphor 
contributing to implicatures. As we think, this boils down to a refinement of the 
notion of ‘saying’, we leave this issue for another paper.  
21 The risk with a nested implicatures scenario is that we may derive implicatures that 
are not intended insofar as they loose the ground with what is said by the utterance. 
Moreover, this is in tension with Grice’s requirement that an implicature be grounded 
in what is said. Finally, where does this process stop (how should I, as a hearer, know 
whether I have retrieved all the implicatures the speaker wanted me to, and that I did 
not stop launching further implicatures just before the most relevant one)? 
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(**)  In ironic metaphor, the metaphorical meaning gives the 
truth-conditions of the utterance. 
This suggests – why treat simple metaphor differently? – that 
(***)  In metaphorical utterances, the metaphorical meaning gives 
the truth-conditions.  
 
The consequence for ironic metaphor is that, given MPT (metaphor is 
computed before irony), and given (*) that metaphor is computed as part 
of what is said, it follows a two-stage version of MPT: metaphorical 
meaning is processed directly (not via the literal meaning) and launches 
irony. This is consistent with – even, suggested by – the finding that non-
ironic metaphor is processed as quickly as non-metaphor (cf. argument (i) 
in section 2.1). But is it consistent with Colston and Gibbs’ (2002) finding 
that processing ironic metaphor takes longer than simple irony? Three-
stage MPT (literalÆmetaphorÆirony) easily explains the finding, since 
simple irony has two stages (literalÆirony). But how can two-stage MPT 
explain the finding? Until an explanation is forthcoming (we made a 
conjecture at the end of section 1.1), two-stage MPT stands to Colston and 
Gibbs’ finding as the neo-Gricean denial that metaphors are processed 
directly stands to (i). 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We argued that the metaphorical meaning is part of the speaker directly 
says, and contributes to the utterance’s truth-conditions. This results from 
the evidence we provided for logical and psychological MPT, namely that 
in all cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is/has to be computed before 
the irony, and more particularly from the argument that metaphor serves as 
vehicle for launching an ironic interpretation. Thus, although metaphor is 
an entirely pragmatic phenomenon, enabling us to do things with the 
linguistic code, it contributes to the semantics (the truth-conditional 
content) of the utterance, being a part of what the speaker communicates 
explicitly. 
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